University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Book Reviews

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2000

Meaning and Motive in the Law of Homicide (reviewing Samuel H.
Pillsbury, Judging Evil: Rethinking the Law of Murder and
Manslaughter)
Guyora Binder
University at Buffalo School of Law, gbinder@buffalo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/book_reviews
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Guyora Binder, Meaning and Motive in the Law of Homicide (reviewing Samuel H. Pillsbury, Judging Evil:
Rethinking the Law of Murder and Manslaughter), 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 755 (2000).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/book_reviews/60

Published as Guyora Binder, Meaning and Motive in the Law of Homicide (reviewing Samuel H. Pillsbury, Judging
Evil: Rethinking the Law of Murder and Manslaughter), 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 755 (2000). © 2000 by the Regents of
the University of California. Copying and permissions notice: Authorization to copy this content beyond fair use (as
specified in Sections 107 and 108 of the U. S. Copyright Law) for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal
use of specific clients, is granted by [the Regents of the University of California/on behalf of the Sponsoring
Society] for libraries and other users, provided that they are registered with and pay the specified fee via
Rightslink® or directly with the Copyright Clearance Center.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Reviews by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

REVIEW ESSAY
Meaning and Motive in the Law of
Homicide
JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER
AND MANSLAUGHTER. By Samuel H. Pillsbury. New
York and London, New York University Press, October
1998. Pp. xiii, 264. $50.00 (cloth), also forthcoming in
paperback, New York University Press, July 2000.
Reviewed by Guyora Binder*
In Judging Evil, Samuel Pillsbury has produced a
comprehensive theory of homicide liability, the first such
effort since Wechsler and Michael's classic articles of the
1930's. 1 These articles laid out and defended an analysis
and gradation of homicide offenses in terms of the
conscious imposition of risk that was later codified in the
influential Model Penal Code. Wechsler and Michael's
approach to homicide typified the Code's approach to
culpability, causation and grading and is therefore
emphasized in most criminal law courses. Thus while
homicide law is significant in itself, it is also significant as
a principal site of the most prominent criminal law reform
Not surprisingly,
effort of the twentieth century.
of homicide has
law
the
of
reform
Pillsbury's proposed
In
broader implications for criminal law generally.
critiquing some features of the Model Penal Code analysis
of homicide, Pillsbury also contributes to recent efforts to
reconceive punishment as symbolic expression and to
reconceive culpability as an assessment of motivation as
well as cognition.
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide
I, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 701 (1973). Herbert Wechsler & Jerome ichael, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide 11, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 1261 (1973).
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In this review I will summarize Pillsbury's reform
proposals and explicate his theoretical claims about
punishment and culpability. I will conclude that these two
theoretical positions both push Pillsbury further than he is
willing to go, so that there is a disjunction between his
premises and his conclusions. A particularly puzzling
result is that Pillsbury basically follows the Model Penal
Code in rejecting the felony murder rule, although his
premises dictate the opposite conclusion.
I. PILLSBURY'S REFORM PROPOSALS
Pillsbury proposes that aggravated or first degree
murder be predicated on the intent to kill or inflict great
violence, plus one of a number of aggravating motives:
killing for profit, to further crime, to affect legal processes,
to gratify hatred of a group, or to exercise "cruel power."
This proposal alters four features of prevailing law.
First, it adds intent to inflict great violence to the
paradigmatic mental state of first degree murder, intent to
kill. This includes among first degree murderers frenzied
killers who may intend only to inflict great pain or injury
on one or several victims without specifically contemplating
their deaths.
Second, it rejects the additional requirement of
premeditation or deliberation for first-degree murder. This
change is designed not only to include the frenzied killer
among first degree murderers, but also to exclude the
mercy killer. The mercy killer may kill coolly and
deliberately, but with a compassionate motive.
Third, it rejects an alternative conception of first
degree murder as an unintentional killing caused in the
course of a particularly dangerous or heinous felony such
as armed robbery, rape, kidnapping, burglary and arson
would be first degree murder. Pillsbury's proposal would
punish as first-degree murder, however, unintentional
killings committed in furtherance of crimes if accompanied
by an intent to inflict great violence.
Fourth, it rejects certain classes of aggravating
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murders from other murders or first-degree murders. For
example, the Model Penal Code views the fact that a killer
is a prisoner 2 or has a prior criminal record' as an
aggravating circumstance. It also makes the imposition of
harm or risk on multiple victims an aggravator. For
Pillsbury, these aggravating circumstances improperly
focus the capital sentencing decision on the killer's
dangerousness rather than on desert.
Pillsbury proposes redefining voluntary manslaughter
as a justifiably enraged killing, committed with intent to
kill or extreme indifference to human life. Pillsbury retains
the familiar conception of voluntary manslaughter as a
murder mitigated by provocation. To qualify for this
mitigation, a defendant must have had good reason to
believe the victim had seriously wronged the defendant or a
defendant's loved one.
This proposal avoids the two most familiar
formulations of voluntary manslaughter. According to
traditional common law rules, the mitigation of an
intentional killing to manslaughter depended upon
adequate provocation-usually a physical blow or
personally witnessed adultery-and no interval or cooling
time between the provoking event and the provoked
killing.4 The Model Penal Code, by contrast, predicates
mitigation upon "extreme mental or emotional disturbance"
for which there is a "reasonable excuse," based on the
situation as the defendant perceived it.,
Pillsbury's
proposal follows the common law rule in that it predicates
mitigation on a partial justification of defendant's conduct
rooted in the wrongdoing of the victim. Yet Pillsbury
broadens the traditionally recognized categories of
provocative wrongdoing and he eliminates the requirement
2. See Model Penal Code § 210.6(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
3. See id. § 210.6(3)(b).
4. See generally, 3 James F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of
England 63 (1883); Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 65462 (1986); Richard G. Singer & John Q. LaFond, Criminal Law 162-65 (1997).
5. Model Penal Code § 210.6(4)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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of an immediate response to provocation. In requiring that
mitigation hinge on the wrongdoing of the victim, Pillsbury
rejects the Model Penal Code's notion that killers should be
partially excused by virtue of strong emotion alone.
Pillsbury would allow those who kill out of fear the
opportunity to mitigate their liability to manslaughter with
a claim of imperfect or unreasonable self-defense. In
general, however, Pillsbury rejects the idea that passion
diminishes responsibility for moral choice. Thus, we have
seen, Pillsbury equates frenzied violence with coldly
premeditated violence. Pillsbury judges offenders by the
quality of their moral reasoning, and he therefore regards
unreasoned or impulsive behavior as reprehensible.
Pillsbury also proposes a major revision of the law of
unintentional homicide. Most jurisdictions punish two
forms of unintentional homicide: homicide by risk-taking
and homicide in the course of crime. Pillsbury has
something to say about each.
Homicide by risk-taking is generally divided into three
grades. Many jurisdictions punish various kinds of
criminally negligent homicide, especially if caused by
negligent driving.6 Criminal negligence is often defined as
the failure to perceive a reasonably apparent risk of harm.7
Most jurisdictions punish reckless homicide as
manslaughter or "involuntary manslaughter" (sometimes
subject to
smaller
penalties
than
"voluntary"
manslaughter). Typically, they define recklessness as
actual awareness of a risk of harm.8 Finally, most
jurisdictions punish some unintentional but grossly
reckless homicides as non-aggravated murder, usually
murder in the second degree. 9 These second-degree murder
statutes usually require recklessness and circumstances
showing "depraved indifference to human life" or "extreme
indifference to human life" or an "abandoned and
malignant heart." These colorful phrases are rarely
6. See, e.g., California Penal Code §§ 192(C), 192.5, 193.5, 193.7 (1982).
7. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
8. See id. § 2.02(c).
9. See Commonwealth v. Malone, 47 A.2d 445 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1946).
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defined further, but they seem to embrace conduct which
either creates an extremely grave risk, perhaps to many
people, ° or which imposes risk for a morally reprehensible
as a sadistic desire to frighten," or a callous
purpose such
2
venality.

1

Pillsbury does not discuss negligent homicide, as his
topic is limited to the law of murder and manslaughter.
However, he proposes revising definitions of depraved
heart murder and involuntary manslaughter so as to focus
on a volitional attitude of indifference to human life rather
than a cognitive awareness of risk. Pillsbury defines
depraved heart murder as causing "the death of a human
being by the disregard of an obvious, extreme and
unjustifiable risk of death, thus demonstrating extreme
indifference to the value of human life."'3
He defines involuntary manslaughter as causing the
death of another "by the disregard of a substantial,
unjustified, and reasonably apparent risk to human life,
under circumstances that demonstrate a basic lack of
concern for the welfare of others." 14
Under these definitions, Pillsbury would punish as
involuntary manslaughter or murder some deaths caused
with little awareness of a risk of death, if the risk was
apparent and the actor had a poor reason for being
unaware of it (voluntary intoxication, for example). And he
would punish death resulting from risk-taking based not
only on the degree of risk, but on the reasons or motives for
which the risk was imposed. Thus a high degree of risk
imposed for a very trivial reason manifests great
indifference to the value of human life and so justifies
murder liability.
In addition to punishing homicide by risk-taking, most
jurisdictions punish unintentional homicide in the course of
10. See People v. Jernatowski, 144 N.E. 497 (N.Y. 1924).
306 (1883).
11. See Mayes v. Illinois, 106 Ill.
12. See People v. Protopappas, 246 Gal. Rptr. 915 (1988)

13. Samuel Pillsbury, Judging Evil:
Manslaughter 184 (1998).

14. Id.

Rethinking the Law of Murder and
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crime. As we have already noted, many punish the causing
of death during a dangerous felony as aggravated murder,
that is murder in the first degree or capital murder. And
as we have also noted, while Pillsbury would recognize the
furtherance of crime as an aggravator for intentional
killings, he rejects the notion that killing in furtherance of
crime can be an aggravated murder unless accompanied by
the intent to kill or commit "great violence." But there are
other forms of liability for unintentional killings in the
course of crime on which Pillsbury does not comment
directly. Thus, many jurisdictions punish the causing of
death during a dangerous felony as simple murder or
murder in the second degree.' 5 And some jurisdictions
punish the causing of death during a felony or even a
misdemeanor as manslaughter, particularly if the predicate
offenses involve some danger to human life or health.",
Pillsbury does not include these lesser forms of
liability for unintentional homicide in the course of crime in
his scheme. Although acknowledging that "the felony
murder rule" takes many different forms in American law,
he criticizes them all as inadequate: "Because the doctrine
requires no mens rea as to the death of the victim, the
connection between legal responsibility and culpability...
remains haphazard." 7
He also asserts that while motives are relevant in
aggravating and mitigating murder, they should not play a
role in defining murder:
In homicide we should employ motive analysis at either
end of the culpability spectrum-for aggravated murder
and... for manslaughters that involve legally adequate
provocation. The great majority of homicide offenses will
fall in between these two doctrines and should remain
crimes that rely on traditional mens rea forms, without

15. See, e.g., Virginia Code Ann. §§ 18.2-32,18.2-33 (Michie 1996)
16. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.1(a) (West 1989).
17. Pillsbury, supra note 13, at 108.
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reference to motive. 18
Thus a bad motive may raise simple to aggravated murder
and a good motive may mitigate murder to manslaughter,
but a bad motive should not aggravate manslaughter to
simple murder.
With the puzzling exception of Pillsbury's treatment of
unintentional homicide in the course of crime, Pillsbury's
proposals are unified by an effort to predicate liability on
deficient moral reasoning rather than merely awareness of
risk. This concern with offenders' reasons for offending
grows out of Pillsbury's account of punishment as a
symbolic or expressive practice. In the next section, I will
explicate and critique Pillsbury's expressive account of
In the final section, I will return to
punishment.
Pillsbury's innovative account of culpability and his
puzzling treatment of homicide in the course of crime.
II. AN EXPRESSiVE ACCOUNT OF PUNISHMENT
Until relatively recently, the possible purposes of
punishment were thought to be pretty well exhausted by
the debate between retributivism and utilitarianism. 9 For
much of the twentieth century, retributivism had little
credibility as a philosophy of punishment. Then the 1970's
witnessed a remarkable revival of retributivism among
academic philosophers and legal theorists and a societywide repudiation of rehabilitation as an aim of punishment.
Among the many arguments that retributivists offered for
punishing on the basis of desert, was a claim that
punishment appropriately expressed blame for wrongdoing
and respect for victims. 20 In the 1980's, some retributivist
philosophers began to have second thoughts about
rehabilitation, as they wondered whether the concept of
18. Id. at 123-24.
19. See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3, 5 (1955).
20. See Jean Hampton, Punishment as Defeat, in Forgiveness and Mercy 12428, 130 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988); Joel Feinberg, Doing and
Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 98-105 (1970).
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punishment bore some relationship to the religious idea of
"repentance." They began to explore a new conception of
punishment as an educative process that necessarily
entailed efforts to persuade the offender to repent and
reform. What both the expressive model of punishment
and the later educative model of punishment shared was a
common characterization of punishment as a kind of
communicative discourse.
Pillsbury, writing in the wake of these developments,
offers a similarly communicative account of punishment,
which I would summarize as follows.
1. In our everyday lives we are very concerned about
making choices. Hence we value choosing.
2. We judge other people's choices morally. Hence we
believe choices can be evaluated and that people are
responsible for their choices.
3.

Actions have social meaning. Choices express values.

4. Crimes unjustly interfere with the preferences of others
and so express contempt for them, or for the importance of
choice.
5. Punishment repudiates the values expressed by the
offense and reaffirms the worth of victims and of choice.
6. A purely utilitarian scheme would muddy that message
by disjoining punishment from wrongdoing.

21. See, e.g., Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 Amer.
Phil. Q. 263 (1981); R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 15-21, 246-62 (1986); Jean
Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 Phil. & Pub. Af 208,
211 (1984).
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7. Therefore, for punishment to effectively communicate
the value of persons and of choice, it must be exclusively
based on desert.
8. Offenders should not be excused based on the social or
psychological causes of crime because these do not affect the
social meaning of their offenses.
9. Offenders should instead be judged on the basis of their
reasons because that is what determines the meaning of
their offense.
Pillsbury's account of punishment as the expression of
a societal opinion about the worthiness of the offender's
reasons for action explains his emphasis on motive and
purpose in developing criteria of aggravation, mitigation
and liability for unintended harm.
Yet Pillsbury's expressive model of punishment raises
host
of difficulties that he does not adequately address.
a
These difficulties are perhaps best illustrated by
considering his approach to the question of whether and
how much to punish offenses caused by unjust social
conditions or prior victimization.
In rejecting the relevance of unjust deprivation and
prior abuse to criminal responsibility, Pillsbury sometimes
One
runs together two quite different arguments.
retributivism.
against
argument is a determinist argument
According to this argument, punishment should not be
based on desert because no one deserves punishment, since
no one is responsible for her choices. Since punishment
cannot be based on desert it should instead be based on
deterrence, reform and incapacitation, with the aim of
determining choices for the better. From this utilitarian
position one may proceed to argue that some offenses are
not easily deterred because of the effects of social
deprivation, or that redressing criminogenic social
conditions is a more cost-effective way of reducing these
offenses than punishment. But a second argument against
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punishing crimes caused by unjust social conditions is
neither determinist nor utilitarian. According to this
argument punishment should depend on desert and desert
depends on responsible voluntary choice. It follows that
those who are deprived of the opportunity to make
meaningful choices are not responsible for their choices and
so do not deserve to be punished for them. Pillsbury rejects
the deterministic position as incompatible with symbolic
function of the criminal law in expressing the value of
choice. But this is of course no answer to the second
argument, which proceeds from voluntarist and
retributivist premises.
What is Pillsbury's answer to the argument that
offenders whose habits and personalities have been shaped
by unjust conditions do not deserve punishment? Pillsbury
in fact concedes that some of these offenders may not be
fully blameworthy for their offenses. Yet, he reasons, we
should not excuse these offenders from punishment
because the causes of wrongdoing do not change its social
meaning.
[Flairness and moral standards are opposed; we must
choose between them. Any move to improve the fairness of
punishment by taking into account social inequities would
diminish our valuation of right conduct. Since in fact we
cannot measure moral disposition... and should care about
right and wrong, we choose responsibility over equity.22
But should we really punish on the basis of the social
meaning of offenses, rather than the offender's
blameworthiness? After all, there can be a disjunction
between the social meaning of an act and the actor's intent
in committing it. Criminal law ordinarily conditions
liability on culpability and responsibility, even if public
perception is that an acquittal endorses the offense. If we
should punish offenses caused by unjust social conditions
in order to symbolize our disapproval of bad conduct, why
not also punish offenses caused by mistake, accident,
22. Pillsbury, supra note 13, at 53.
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duress and insanity?
Furthermore, given that there are many ways that
society can express its value commitments, it is not clear
that the goal of expressing those values can, by itself,
justify punishment. Granting the desirability of expressing
condemnation of the value choices made by offenders, why
Pillsbury's
does this necessitate inflicting suffering?
account of punishment perhaps justifies its denunciatory
aspect, but does not thereby automatically justify the
afflictive aspect of punishment, the justification of which
has been the traditional preoccupation of punishment
theorists.
Finally, if punishment is to be justified by-and
distributed according to-its symbolic significance, rather
than desert, it is important to be honest about that
particularly
Punishment,
significance.
symbolic
punishment of the victims of past social injustice, expresses
many other messages beyond a condemnation of the
punished conduct. If a very substantial portion of one
demographic group is punished, that may be interpreted as
an expression of contempt for or indifference to the welfare
of that group. If such a group has been treated unjustly,
the disproportionate punishment of members of that group
may tend to legitimate that history of injustice. In a
society that resolves many policy questions on a utilitarian
basis, the decision to punish offenders without regard to
the social consequences may imply those offenders-or the
groups to which they belong-do not merit consideration in
There are also messages
the social welfare calculus.
generally. Different
incarceration
of
rates
high
by
implied
societies rely on incarceration to a greater or lesser extent
for social control. High incarceration rates may express a
low opinion of the population as a whole or lack of
confidence in such alternative mechanisms of social control
If punishment is to be
as education and persuasion.
justified and distributed only on the basis of its symbolic
significance, it will be necessary to take all of its meanings
into account, not just the palatable ones. Just as the social
meaning of offending is not controlled by the intentions of
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the offender, neither is the social meaning of punishment
controlled by the intentions of lawmakers or legal theorists.
III. CULPABILITY AS COGNITION AND MOTIVATION

As noted above, many of Pillsbury's proposed reforms
of the law of homicide condition liability on the actors'
reasons, purposes and motives. Pillsbury would aggravate
intentional murder to murder in the first degree only on
the basis of heinous motives, and mitigate intentional
murder to voluntary manslaughter only on the basis of a
He would redefine
motive of righteous indignation.
depraved heart murder and involuntary manslaughter as
crimes of culpable indifference to the welfare of others
rather than simply awareness of risk. As part of this
redefinition, he would condition liability on the moral
worth of the reasons or motives for imposing risk rather
than just on the degree of risk imposed and the degree of
awareness of that risk.
This redefinition of culpability for homicide as a
matter of motivation as well as cognition exemplifies a new
and important development in criminal law theory.
Recently, a number of younger criminal law scholars have
mounted a challenge to the Model Penal Code's reduction of
culpability to awareness of risk. They have argued that the
assessment of culpability necessarily involves a judgment
of the quality and character of the actor's practical reason
that pays more attention to the values and purposes
expressed by action.
In an important article, "Virtue and Inculpation"
Kyron Huigens argued:
We blame and punish, ultimately, because each of us
reasonably demands that each of the others pursues his
chosen ends with a due regard for us-with a certain
amount of maturity, disinterestedness, and perspicacity.
We blame and punish if we find that quality of judgment
lacking. It is not just harm, but the lack of judgment that
results in harm that the criminal law condemns .... [Iln
judging a person guilty we reject his chosen ends as
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improper.2 3
On the basis of these premises, Huigens supported
criminal liability for negligent harm, despite the fact that
negligent actors have no conscious awareness of a risk of
Huigens reasoned that the negligent actor is
harm.
culpable for being so hasty or absorbed in projects of
perhaps dubious worth that she fails to inform herself
about their consequences for others. Thus unawareness of
risk is culpable when the attitudes and aims that produce
Huigens therefore
such unawareness are unworthy.
treatment of
Code's
Penal
Model
disagrees with the
negligence as an anomalous or exceptional basis for
liability.
Further implications follow from these premises: if
what makes inattention to risk culpable is a lack of concern
for others and devotion to unworthy aims, these same
volitional attitudes should enhance the culpability of actors
who are aware of risk. Thus there is a volitional or
motivational component to recklessness as well as
negligence. In addition, even without awareness of risk, an
actor's inattention to the welfare of others may be so great,
or may be motivated by such trivial or even reprehensible
aims, that she should be regarded as reckless rather than
merely negligent. Another way of putting this idea is that
we severely punish the conscious imposition of risk not
because it is worse than a volitional attitude of indifference
to harm, but because it provides a very clear manifestation
Such a reinterpretation of
of such indifference.
recklessness as indifference was developed by Kenneth
Simons in his important article, "Rethinking Mental
States."'
Simons similarly criticized the Model Penal Code's
sharp distinction between conscious risk-taking and
unreasonable inattention to risk:

23. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1423, 1424
(1995).
24. Kenneth Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463 (1992).
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Many modern legal standards devalue desire states relative
to belief or cognitive states. For example, the influential
Model Penal Code differentiates criminal recklessness from
negligence in only one respect: recklessness requires
conscious awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk,
while negligence requires that the actor should have been
aware of such a risk. Yet a traditional and defensible view
sees recklessness as culpable indifference to risk (emphasis
added). The terms "indifference," "not caring," and
"callousness" all describe a culpable desire state-not a
desire to harm, but an insufficiently strong aversion to
harm, or a desire or willingness to create a risk of harm.
The modern account of recklessness, emphasizing cognitive
awareness of a risk, ignores or conceals the moral quality
25
that "culpable indifference" expresses.
If recklessness, like negligence and purpose, is actually
a desiderative state rather than a cognitive state, what
about the last remaining culpable mental state defined by
the Model Penal Code, "knowledge?" In a recent article
Alan Michaels has argued that just as awareness of a risk
of harm is morally significant as an index of a desiderative
attitude of indifference to harm, knowledge of certain harm
is morally significant as an even worse desiderative
attitude: "acceptance" of harm.
[W]hat is it that makes the knowing actor morally culpable
in the first place? It is not, of course, the knowledge that a
particular action will be harmful. There is nothing wrong
with the knowledge if the person chooses not to act... what
makes the knowing actor morally culpable is.... [t]he fact
that... knowledge that she would cause harm was not
sufficient to stop her from acting ....

This is the core

definition of acceptance. Acceptance and knowledge thus
represent the same level of culpability.26

It follows from this analysis that knowledge of harm is
merely evidence of this culpable attitude of acceptance, and
25. Id. at 466.
26. Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 953, 967 (1998).
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that acceptance of harm could be established in other ways.
Acceptance might be established by statements, for
example, or by evidence that an offender has willfully
avoided knowledge of an inculpatory fact she suspects to be
true.
Dan Kahan is another criminal law scholar who has
challenged a purely cognitive conception of culpability. In
an article co-authored with the philosopher Martha
Nussbaum, Kahan argued against what he called a
"mechanistic" conception of emotion as a force independent
of the actor's will that interferes with rational choice and so
diminishes moral responsibility for action. Instead, Kahan
and Nussbaum argued for an "evaluative" conception of
emotion as an indispensable part of practical reason that
should itself be subject to moral assessment." Reasoning
from such premises, Kahan and Nussbaum conclude with
Pillsbury that the defense of provocation, reducing murder
to manslaughter liability, should be conditioned on the
moral worthiness of the strong emotions prompting the
homicide. They likewise share Pillsbury's critique of the
Model Penal Code's extreme emotional disturbance defense
for allowing any reasonably excusable emotion to mitigate
28
homicide liability.

For Kahan and Nussbaum, as for Pillsbury, offending
is a kind of communicative or meaning-making activity. To
assess a provoked killing is to read it as the expression of
an offended sense of honor and dignity, and to assess the
propriety of that moral emotion. In a second article, Kahan
extends his attack on purely cognitive models of culpability
to the question of mistake of law. Here he argues that the
exculpatory effect of mistakes of law should depend on a
moral assessment of the offender's ends, and a moral
assessment of the norms embodied in the law. Thus,
27. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion
in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 278-97 (1996).
28. See id. at 305-23. Priority goes to Pillsbury who earlier articulated these
ideas in Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Punishment, 22 Cornell L.
Rev. 655 (1989) and Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 437
(1990).
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nonnegligent ignorance of laws criminalizing mala
prohibita should excuse while ignorance of laws
criminalizing mala in se offenses should not. Ignorance of
the law should excuse only the morally virtuous, Kahan
contends. "
Pillsbury's reconstruction of homicide law around
motive and indifference rather than awareness of risk
should be understood as part of the larger project of
reconstructing culpability around desiderative states that
has also been pursued by Simons, Huigens, Kahan and
Michaels. Yet it is a curiously inconsistent and fainthearted application of these principles. For Pillsbury
draws back in horror from one of the clearest but also most
controversial implications of this perspective for the law of
homicide: the legitimacy of the felony murder rule.
Pillsbury regards this doctrine as an unacceptable
allocation of heavy moral responsibility for death on the
basis of strict liability. He urges the elimination of firstdegree felony murder and he leaves felony murder out of
his reconstruction of second-degree murder liability.
Furthermore, although giving motive an important place in
the analysis of culpability for first degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter, he denies its relevance to the
analysis of culpability for second degree murder (although
he in fact relies on motive analysis even here).
Why would a reconstruction of culpability around the
moral assessment of motives and desires support the felony
murder rule? In the first place, the felony murder rule is
not a strict liability rule, at least not in the form in which it
is found in almost every American jurisdiction.
As
Pillsbury concedes, most American jurisdictions condition
felony murder either on a short list of inherently dangerous
predicate offenses, or simply on the dangerousness of the
underlying felony or the means by which it was
perpetrated. ° While he doesn't say so, most of the
remaining jurisdictions condition it on some level of
29. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law is an Excuse-But only for the
Virtuous, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 127 (1997)
30. See Pillsbury, supra note 13, at 108.
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culpability with respect to the risk of death,31 or on
proximate cause standards that condition liability on the
foreseeability of death.2
When felony murder is
conditioned on dangerous predicate offenses, it is not a
strict liability crime, but a crime of negligence, as Simons

explains:
On first impression, any grading differential for which no
formal culpability is required seems inconsistent with
retributivism. Consider felony-murder as an example. We
punish the felony at a certain level. We do not otherwise
punish nonculpable homicide. Thus, adding a penalty to the
felony because it resulted in death seems no more justifiable
than punishing someone for an accidental, non-negligent
homicide today simply because he committed a felony last year.
But this analysis is incorrect. Often, culpably doing X,
which happens to cause Y, amounts to negligence (or to a
higher culpability, such as recklessness) as to Y. Consider a
more specific felony murder example. If armed robbery is the
predicate felony, then it is not difficult to conclude that an
armed robber should foresee, and often does foresee, a
significant risk that robbery will result in a death. Thus, the
robber is ordinarily negligent and often reckless as to the risk
of death.
This analysis suggests that formal strict liability as to
death (i.e. the lack of any explicit culpability requirement) can
nevertheless be consistent with substantive culpability.
So the felony murder rule, as actually applied, imposes
liability on the basis of at least negligence with respect to
the risk of death. And, as we have seen, a theory of
culpability that assesses the role of motive and desire in
practical judgment approves of criminal liability for the
negligent infliction of harm.
Moreover, it does not
necessarily distinguish recklessness or even depraved
31. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 707-701 (1976) (purpose); Ark. Code Ann., §
41.1502 (Michie 1987) (gross indifference); Labastida v. State, 931 P.2d 1334
(Nev. 1996) (gross indifference); State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196 (N.M. 1991)
(recklessness); Del. Code Ann., tit. 11, §§ 636(a)(2), (6) (1979) (criminal
negligence).
32. See, e.g., People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 539 (Il. 1935).
33. Kenneth W. Simons, When is Strict Liability Just, 87 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1075, 1121-22 (1997).
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indifference from negligence on the basis of actual
awareness of risk. Instead, it does so on the basis of the
degree of indifference to the welfare of others manifested
by the imposition of risk. Indeed, Pillsbury himself is
willing to hold drunk drivers liable for manslaughter and
even murder when their actions cause death, despite their
unawareness of the risk they are imposing while they are
driving. He counts the ability to justify these results as
evidence of the superiority of the "indifference" conception
of recklessness to the "awareness" conception.34 Thus
Pillsbury concludes that actual knowledge of risk is
irrelevant to the culpable indifference that can give rise to
manslaughter or murder liability: "In unintentional
homicide, a determination of culpable indifference depends
on three factors: (1) notice of danger, (2) extent of danger,
and (3) the defendant's reasons for acting in a dangerous
fashion." 5
As this passage indicates, Pillsbury also conditions
culpable indifference on the actor's motives.
Thus,
Pillsbury concludes that a driver speeding to rush a sick
child to the hospital is less culpable then a driver speeding
to impress his friends. Similarly, a surgeon who, out of
greed, provided grossly inadequate supervision and
monitoring of anesthesia should be guilty of murder for the
resulting deaths even if he was somehow unaware of the
risk he was imposing."6 Thus, a trivial or reprehensible
motive enhances culpability for the foreseeable imposition
of risk because it implies that the offender places very little
value on the welfare of others. And there could hardly be a
worse motive for foreseeably imposing risk than to further
a serious crime. Indeed, this assessment of felonious
motive is implicit in Pillsbury's proposals for aggravating
and mitigating intentional homicides. Pillsbury is willing
to aggravate liability for killing in furtherance of crime,
and to mitigate liability for killing in revenge for crime.
So, on Pillsbury's premises, the foreseeable imposition
34. See Pillsbury, supra note 13, at 176-79.
35. Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
36. See id. at 171-72.
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of risk is culpable and actual knowledge of risk is not
necessary for manslaughter or murder liability. Moreover,
the degree of culpable indifference depends on the degree of
foreseeable risk and the moral worth of the motive for
imposing it. Finally, dangerous felonies involve
considerable foreseeable risk by definition, and the desire
to commit a dangerous felony is a very bad motive, that can
aggravate murder liability. From these premises it follows
that offenders are very culpable for deaths they cause as a
result of acts committed in furtherance of dangerous
felonies.
They are more culpable than those who
foreseeably impose a substantial risk for a trivial or even
morally reprehensible motive. Such offenders are, on
Pillsbury's premises, extremely indifferent to human life
and should be punished as murderers. Whether they are so
culpable that they deserve punishment as aggravated
murderers is another question. But Pillsbury offers no
reason why we should not punish an extreme indifference
murder as aggravated murder, if the danger imposed was
sufficiently apparent and substantial, and the felonious
motive for which it was imposed was sufficiently heinous.
The felony murder rule continues in force in the vast
majority of American jurisdictions'3 despite the constant
complaints of criminal law scholars that it lacks any
plausible basis in principles of desert. 8 Because they have
eschewed efforts to develop any cogent moral rationale for
the felony murder rule, the legal academy has rendered
itself irrelevant to its further development and reform.
Unfortunately, Pillsbury has perpetuated this strategic
misjudgment. Although Pillsbury does not admit it, his
premises in fact justify punishing the causation of death in
the course of dangerous felonies as murder at least, and
possibly aggravated murder in some cases. In failing to
37. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A
Study of the Forces that Shape our Criminal Law, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1429
(1994).
38. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L.
Rev. 413 (1981); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A
Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 446 (1985).
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acknowledge this implication, Pillsbury has squandered an
opportunity: the chance to offer the first general theory of
homicide that plausibly accounts for the felony murder
rule. Had he done so, he would have clearly demonstrated
the superiority of his desiderative account of culpability
over Wechsler's cognitive account as a "rationale" of the
American law of homicide.

